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Introduction1
New Zealanders don’t realise that they are regularly regarded 
in other countries as world leaders, not just in sport. 
Inaugural New Zealander of the year in 2010, Ray Avery, 
points to the ‘never say it can’t be done’ attitude that has 
produced many astonishing results in science. In social policy 
too we have often been ahead of world thinking. One very 
under-trumpeted innovation is our retirement incomes 
policy, which, along with ACC, is unique on the world stage. 
 
New Zealand Superannuation (NZS), the 
foundation of New Zealand’s retirement 
income system, is a universal, pay-as-you-
go (PAYG), taxable age pension, partially 
pre-funded by accumulated assets in the 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund. 
Alongside NZS sits KiwiSaver, the world’s 
first national auto-enrolment saving 
scheme. New Zealand’s success with the 
‘soft compulsion’ of automatic enrolment 
has been and is continuing to be an 
influence in the design of opt-out schemes 
in the UK, Ireland and the United States. 
Seven years on, this retirement saving 
scheme both is well accepted by the public 
and has certain clever design features.
If KiwiSaver is made compulsory, as 
some powerful lobbies propose, there are 
large complexities to resolve, including 
the future role of the universal state 
pension, NZS. It is timely to reflect on the 
really good things about our retirement 
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incomes framework before making ill-
considered changes. Looking to the 
future, this article suggests that New 
Zealand is in a unique position to build 
on this framework and offer leadership 
in helping solve some of the intractable 
issues around decumulation that are 
plaguing other countries. 
New Zealand Superannuation
New Zealand introduced the old-
age pension in 1898 to provide some 
protection for the deserving poor 
aged over 65. Over 100 years later, the 
retirement income framework has, at its 
foundation, a flat-rate, universal, taxable 
benefit, paid out of current taxation. 
Eligibility is from the age of 65 years, if 
modest residency requirements are met.2 
Under a current political agreement, 
the combined net NZS rate for a couple 
has to be at least 66% of the net average 
wage (33% per married person). Higher 
rates apply for single people either living 
alone or sharing accommodation (see 
Table 1). NZS is indexed annually via the 
Consumers Price Index until the wage 
floor of 66% is reached, then net pensions 
rise with the net average wage. 
Home ownership rates are high 
amongst the ‘baby boom’ generation, 
and thus housing costs are relatively low. 
When compared with basic age pensions 
internationally, and with other welfare 
benefits domestically, NZS is generous. 
As a consequence, New Zealand has low 
rates of pensioner hardship, despite high 
rates of hardship among those on welfare 
benefits (Perry, 2013). In the future, 
however, falling home ownership rates 
may affect the degree to which NZS is 
adequate to remove hardship for those 
who rent.
The level of welfare benefits, indexed 
only to prices since 1991 when the level 
of welfare benefits was cut, has fallen well 
behind NZS over time. Figure 1 illustrates 
how indexation of NZS to wages has 
continued to produce a growing gap 
between NZS and welfare benefits.
At retirement, while low-income 
earners do fairly well in an international 
comparison of public pensions, those on 
average earnings or above have relatively 
low replacement rates if just the state 
pension is considered (OECD, 2011, 
p.125). Individuals have been expected 
to save privately, including in employer-
sponsored superannuation schemes, to 
achieve higher effective replacement rates 
in retirement. 
KiwiSaver
KiwiSaver is the world’s first national auto-
enrolment saving scheme. It was initially 
conceived as a purely voluntary saving 
scheme, with a modest government-
provided kick-start and a fees subsidy as 
‘sweeteners’. KiwiSaver is fully portable. 
Thus, when members change jobs or they 
leave employment their scheme goes with 
them, providing a valuable simplification 
over traditional employer-based schemes. 
With some exceptions, all new employees 
are automatically enrolled in KiwiSaver if 
they are not already members. Currently, 
employees and employers each contribute 
3% of wages. Enrolled employees can 
chose to opt out, or go on a contributions 
holiday after a year of contributions. (For 
more detail see St John, Littlewood and 
Dale, 2014, as in References an U Auckland 
website)
In 2014 the tax-funded subsidies 
comprise just the kick-start at $1,000 
for new members and a maximum $520 
government contribution for the first 
$1,040 of annual member contributions. 
By international standards these subsidies 
are extremely modest, and their unindexed 
nature implies that they will fall in value 
quite quickly over time. 
KiwiSaver is not designed solely as an 
employment-based scheme and is widely 
inclusive in its conception. This interesting 
feature has helped membership reach 
over 2.1 million,3 in a total population of 
4.3 million.
Purpose of the scheme 
The purpose of KiwiSaver has been, at 
times, confused. Is KiwiSaver’s purpose to 
benefit the individual in retirement? Is it 
to reduce the pressures on the economy 
of an ageing population? Is KiwiSaver 
supposed to solve the national saving 
problem? Or is it to expand the managed-
fund industry? As long as the purposes are 
unclear, the scheme is vulnerable to the 
industry determining the design of the 
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Table 1: New Zealand Superannuation rates at 1 April 2014
Category % net average wage*
Annual rate            
NZ$ (gross)
Annual Net 
Primary Tax
Annual Net 33% 
Tax
Single, living alone 43% $21,932 $19,080 $14,494
Single, sharing 40% $20,154 $17,613 $13,503
Married person or partner in civil 
union or de facto relationship 
(each) 33% $16,633 $14,678 $11,144
Source: Work and Income website: http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/  
* Supplementary income- and asset-tested benefits may also be paid. 
Figure 1: Married unemployment benefit vs NZS payments
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scheme to meet its own objectives. 
When KiwiSaver was first announced, 
the pivotal problem was seen to be one 
of low national saving. New Zealand is 
heavily reliant on foreign saving, with 
persistently large current account deficits 
and accumulated overseas debt. However, 
it was not clear that KiwiSaver was 
capable of lifting national saving.4 By the 
time the KiwiSaver Bill was introduced 
there was little mention of the current 
account deficit problem. The purpose of 
the KiwiSaver Act 2006 is described thus:
to encourage a long-term savings 
habit and asset accumulation by 
individuals who are not in a position 
to enjoy standards of living in 
retirement similar to those in pre-
retirement. The Act aims to increase 
individuals’ well-being and financial 
independence, particularly in 
retirement, and to provide retirement 
benefits. To that end, this Act 
enables the establishment of schemes 
(KiwiSaver schemes) to facilitate 
individuals’ savings, principally 
through the workplace. (KiwiSaver 
Act 2006)
A reference to the hope that national 
saving will improve was buried on p.36 
of the bill, and was not included in the 
act:
If the behavioural changes flow 
through into increased domestic 
saving, then economic growth 
may increase as more funds may 
be available to fund domestic 
investment and reduce New Zealand’s 
reliance on borrowing offshore.
Law, Meehan and Scobie (2011) 
estimated that only about one third of 
the members’ contributions to KiwiSaver 
are ‘new’ savings. Even if there is an 
impact on household saving, there is 
no guarantee that national saving (the 
sum of private and public saving) will 
improve. Importantly, while some of the 
rhetoric suggests that more KiwiSaver 
saving equals more investment and 
growth, in practice more saving from any 
source does not ‘cause’ more or better 
investment.
The Inland Revenue Department 
(2011) concluded: 
It estimated, on the conditions and 
settings of the scheme at that time, 
that over the ten years to 2021 the 
net contribution of KiwiSaver to 
national savings would be marginal 
at best in the longer term, and may 
in fact reduce national savings. 
The goals of improving retirement 
incomes and expanding national saving 
are inherently contradictory. Unless there 
is attention to the decumulation issues 
discussed below, KiwiSaver may simply 
facilitate extra consumption by the better-
off cohorts of a larger retired population, 
imposing more pressure on the working-
age population. 
Tax reforms and success of auto-enrolment 
New Zealand is fortunate to have reformed 
its tax treatment of saving for retirement 
many years before KiwiSaver was 
introduced. Based on the principle of tax 
neutrality, the New Zealand tax reforms of 
1988–1990 abolished all tax concessions 
for private retirement saving (St John, 
2005, 2007). Contributions, whether by 
employer or employee, are out of after-tax 
income (T); fund earnings were taxed at a 
rate that proxies the individual’s marginal 
rate (T); but withdrawals are a return of 
tax-paid capital and hence tax-exempt 
(E). Under TTE, saving for retirement the 
same as saving in a bank account contrasts 
with the heavily-subsidised EET treatment 
conventional for retirement saving in 
other developed countries, including 
Australia. 
The removal of all tax concessions 
accelerated both the shift from Defined 
Benefit (DB) employer-based pension 
schemes to Defined Contribution (DC) 
or lump sum schemes and a decline 
in coverage. Importantly, even public 
sector DB schemes were closed to new 
members. The lack of impediments from 
a strong, tax-incentivised, employer-
based superannuation culture allowed 
a clean roll-out of KiwiSaver as the new 
auto-enrolment national saving scheme 
in 2007.
With well-designed but modest 
sweeteners, KiwiSaver has become the 
occupational saving vehicle of choice 
for most New Zealanders, including 
for many within the public sector. Even 
when subsidies were greatly extended and 
enhanced on the eve of the introduction 
of KiwiSaver in 2007, there was never any 
intention of a return to the regressive tax 
concessions of the past. In the last few 
years these subsidies have been cut back, 
as detailed in St John, Littlewood and 
Dale (2014). Interestingly, it appears that 
once sweeteners have helped establish 
KiwiSaver they can be reduced with little 
impact, at least on the formal membership 
numbers. 
In contrast to the ease of introduction 
in New Zealand, the UK and Ireland face 
two impediments in introducing their 
auto-enrolment schemes. First, they have 
retained their over-generous, unreformed 
DB schemes for public sector employees. 
Second, they have a proliferation of 
employer-based DC schemes. These 
diverse and poorly-regulated schemes are 
the beneficiaries of new auto-enrolment 
proposals. The OECD notes: ‘much can be 
done to improve the design of DC pension 
plans and to strengthen retirement 
income adequacy in these plans’ (OECD, 
2012). In their Ready for Ageing? report 
With well-designed but modest 
sweeteners, KiwiSaver has become the 
occupational saving vehicle of choice for 
most New Zealanders, including for many 
within the public sector.
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(2013) the House of Lords observed: ‘the 
current DC pensions system is not fit 
for purpose for anyone who is not rich, 
or who moves in and out of work’, and 
the need to ‘tackle the lack of certainty 
in DC pensions and address their serious 
defects’. Compounding these issues, the 
very generous tax incentives for both 
DB and DC schemes are widely viewed 
as regressive, expensive and unnecessary. 
They are, however, difficult to remove, 
making a more rational framework like 
that in New Zealand near impossible to 
adopt.
Administration
A clever feature of KiwiSaver is the 
administration by a central collection 
agency, the Inland Revenue Department, 
with a unique tax identifier for individuals, 
who have one provider, that they chose, and 
one account. This has avoided the problems 
found in Australia, where many individuals 
have small sums in multiple accounts.5 In 
the UK, the National Employment Savings 
Trust (NEST) auto-enrolment plan has 
required a separate infrastructure for 
administration. Auto-enrolment can be 
into the employer’s existing DC schemes, 
so that the NEST scheme is not a generic 
national saving plan. 
Similarly, in the US auto-enrolment 
for employer-based 401(k) plans is 
voluntary, and no national clearing 
house is proposed. The WorldatWork and 
American Benefits Institute (2013) notes 
that: ‘Ultimately, companies without 
auto enrolment are more likely to report 
lower employee participation rates 
than those with automatic enrolment.’ 
When employees change jobs, 401(k) 
plans must be either retained with the 
former employer or transferred, giving 
an additional complexity not faced by 
KiwiSaver members.
Monitoring and regulation 
As a generic product, KiwiSaver has 
facilitated the umbrella regulation 
and oversight provided by the newly-
established and fit-for-purpose Financial 
Markets Authority. While individual 
providers can offer separate products, 
they do not have to do the marketing and 
branding of KiwiSaver itself. 
The flaws in KiwiSaver
Lack of a decumulation policy 
Despite clever features, there are 
nevertheless substantial flaws in the New 
Zealand approach if it is assumed that 
income supplementation is the point of 
KiwiSaver. Currently, there are no rules 
as to how lump sum KiwiSaver funds 
accessed at age 65 must be run down over 
the retirement period. The danger is that 
funds will be dissipated far too early in 
retirement, with many people finding they 
live much longer than they anticipated. 
While New Zealand was an early adopter 
of the worldwide trend to shift risks 
from employers to individuals in private 
superannuation schemes, lump sum or 
DC schemes, including KiwiSaver, do not 
currently assist with the management of 
risks in retirement, as noted in the three-
yearly review by the Commission for 
Financial Literacy and Retirement Income 
(2013). Specifically, these are the longevity 
risk that may see an individual outliving 
their capital; the risk of loss through poor 
investment; and the inflation risk (Cooper, 
2014). Older people using capital too 
early in retirement and requiring a state 
subsidy for long-term care is also a risk for 
society.
In other countries there are emergent 
issues with the risks of the period of 
decumulation. The UK has until recently 
required mandatory annuitisation of 
lump sum savings from subsidised 
DC retirement schemes. However, the 
Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition 
government announced in 2010 that it 
intended to end the requirement for DC 
pension scheme members to purchase 
annuities by the age of 75 (Blake, Cannon 
and Tonks, 2010). Noting that ‘the 
annuities market is currently not working 
in the best interests of all consumers. It 
is neither competitive nor innovative and 
some consumers are getting a poor deal’, 
the government has recently announced 
a radical set of reforms which will 
allow people more choice over how 
they access their defined contribution 
pension savings. From April 2015 the 
government proposes to change the 
tax rules to allow people to access 
these savings as they wish at the 
point of retirement, subject to their 
marginal rate of income tax (rather 
than the current 55% charge for full 
withdrawal). (HM Treasury, 2014)
While it is clear that the market for 
annuities suffers many aspects of market 
failure, this decision is an extreme 
response, akin to throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater, and is causing great 
uncertainty within the industry. There 
may be a stronger case for better annuities 
rather than no annuities at all if the risks 
retirees face are to be addressed. 
New Zealand’s unique opportunity
With the provision of initially generous, 
tax-funded subsidies, the government 
might have been justified in imposing 
restrictions on spending the maturing 
KiwiSaver lump sums. That option was 
ignored, indeed not even discussed, and 
the opportunity was lost. It is hard to 
imagine that, retrospectively, compulsory 
annuitisation could now be imposed. New 
Zealand’s annuities market is virtually 
non-existent, and under current tax rules 
and lack of government support, including 
inflation indexing or long-term bonds, 
a viable annuities market is unlikely to 
emerge (St John, 2009).
However, there are now opportunities 
for innovative thinking. New Zealand has 
a unique opportunity, with a largely tax-
neutral TTE regime for accumulation, to 
design an explicit subsidy to recognise the 
New Zealand has a unique opportunity, with a 
largely tax-neutral TTE regime for accumulation, 
to design an explicit subsidy to recognise the 
gains to society from annuitisation, with few of the 
disadvantages of traditional tax incentives.
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gains to society from annuitisation, with 
few of the disadvantages of traditional 
tax incentives. One of several possibilities 
is the provision of a tax-subsidised 
limited value, inflation-adjusted, gender-
neutral annuity to supplement NZS, 
purchased out of lump sum savings, 
including a suitable share of home equity 
if required (St John, Dale and Ashton, 
2012). Let’s call this annuity ‘KiwiSpend’ 
and imagine it as a generic product like 
KiwiSaver where private providers may 
play a role. Like KiwiSaver, KiwiSpend 
would be regulated by the Financial 
Markets Authority. It would require 
considerable state oversight, maybe even 
state provision, and subsidies to ensure 
that the annuity is inflation-proofed, 
has low fees and the same capital cost 
for women and men, and includes long-
term care insurance. As outlined in St 
John, Dale and Ashton (2012), a retiree’s 
private saving, including KiwiSaver, could 
be used to buy an inflation-adjusted 
annuity of up to $10,000 per annum, 
with an insurance rider that provides a 
trebling of the annuity if the recipient is 
assessed as needing residential long-term 
care. Success in New Zealand in designing 
such a product would once more attract 
considerable international attention.
The dangers of compulsion 
The economic success of Australia is often 
attributed to the fact its superannuation 
scheme is compulsory. This is purported 
to have added to the capital base and 
encouraged domestic investment and 
strong growth (Brogden, 2013).6 Most 
KiwiSaver schemes by volume of members 
are owned by Australian-based financial 
service providers which have profited 
from Australia’s compulsory retirement 
savings scheme. Despite the fact that 
KiwiSaver has been in place only since 
2007, there are many calls, especially 
from the industry, to make it compulsory 
(Financial Services Council, 2014). In the 
lead-up to the 2011 election, and now 
in the lead-up to the 2014 election, the 
Labour Party, the Mäori Party and New 
Zealand First have suggested that making 
KiwiSaver compulsory would create 
more household saving and help solve 
New Zealand’s economic problems. The 
framework for compulsion is in place; 
the major changes needed would be to 
remove the opt-out and the contributions 
holiday provisions.
There are two principal concerns 
about compulsion. First, it is undesirable 
to force those who cannot afford to save 
into the scheme, but it is difficult to 
design exemptions that are fair. Second, 
there will be inevitable pressures to 
integrate KiwiSaver with NZS. Given 
the contribution that taxpayers make to 
the accumulation of KiwiSaver benefits, 
it would seem logical that a future 
government might link KiwiSaver and 
NZS, either directly with the kind of 
offset suggested recently by Sir Michael 
Cullen (2013), or through a general 
means test much as in Australia. This may 
undermine the advantages of a universal 
pension, although there is a case that can 
be made for more claw-back on NZS 
using the tax system (St John, 2012).
Evidence from Australia suggests 
that compulsion has not stopped 
offsetting borrowing that sees retirees 
reach retirement with more debt. Also, 
Australians seem to retire earlier and 
collect their compulsory retirement 
savings as a lump sum. Compulsion, 
including of the employer-matching 
contribution, may please people who 
work in payroll and in financial service 
provision, but would also be seen as an 
additional cost to employers. 
Conclusion
The New Zealand combination of 
universal taxable floor of income, 
NZS, combined with a voluntary auto-
enrolment saving scheme to supplement, 
not replace, the universal state pension, 
is a successful model with a lot to offer 
the rest of the world. If current trends 
continue, KiwiSaver will continue to 
supplant the role of employer-subsidised 
superannuation and retail schemes. While 
this may have an ambiguous effect on total 
saving (Savings Working Group, 2011), 
the scheme should not be judged on its 
presumed macroeconomic effects.
One of the clear advantages of 
KiwiSaver is that it is fully portable. This 
is facilitated by the unique tax identifier 
and the Inland Revenue Department 
acting as the clearing house. It is also 
inclusive, and the minimal tax incentives 
have been designed to limit regressivity. 
The major focus now ought to be firmly 
on improving the outcomes of security 
in retirement for those who have not 
traditionally enjoyed the advantages of 
work-based plans. If the needs of formerly 
disenfranchised people, including many 
women and other disadvantaged groups, 
are placed at the centre, the decumulation 
of KiwiSaver must be designed primarily 
to achieve meaningful amounts of 
extra, secure income for them to 
supplement the state pension, regardless 
of how long they live. New Zealand has 
a unique opportunity to design a generic 
KiwiSpend decumulation product that 
adopts some of the clever features of 
KiwiSaver, possibly also incorporating 
long-term care insurance (Retirement 
Policy and Research Centre, 2012). If 
successful it would be likely to become a 
beacon of light in an increasingly complex 
international pensions’ world. 
1 This article draws on work done in the Retirement Policy 
and Research Centre, Auckland Business School, University 
of Auckland, and in particular St John, Littlewood and Dale 
(2014). Susan St John was invited to Ireland and the UK in 
February 2014 to address key stakeholders on the design 
features of the New Zealand retirement framework. The 
author thanks Bob Stephens and Judith Davey for comments 
on an earlier draft of this article.
2 Ten years in New Zealand after age 20, with at least five of 
those after age 50.
3 See http://www.kiwisaver.govt.nz/statistics/ks-annual-
statistics.html. 
4 The best thing the government did during the upswing of 
the six years preceding the global financial crisis to improve 
national saving was to run surpluses.
5 It appears that $AUD15 billion in Australia’s SG scheme is 
sitting in lost or unclaimed accounts. See http://www.thorner.
co.nz/tag/australian-superannuation-guarantee/.
6 The mining boom is often ignored in these analyses. Other 
voices are more sceptical see (Ingles, 2009).
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